Map and Counters

More Recommended Rules Changes for WAR IN THE EAST

INTRODUCTION

In Part I of this essay, I presented several experimental changes to the WAR IN THE EAST (1st Ed.) rules governing railroad repair units and the formation of battle groups. The purpose of this initial batch of ‘optional’ rules modifications was two-fold: first, to offer players a simple way to increase the standard game’s historical realism; and second, to modify the rules platform in order to create a more challenging and intense gaming experience. Part II of this essay continues where Part I left off by presenting more experimental changes to the standard rules; to whit, a new set of optional rules that modify both the effectiveness and the battlefield mobility of Soviet anti-tank brigades. As was the case with Part I, these changes can be used independently or in combination with some or all of the other procedural modifications presented as part of this project. Readers are again warned, however, that some of these alternative rules — because of their divergence from those found in the standard game — can, and often will, dramatically alter the flow and tempo of WAR IN THE EAST (1^st Ed.); for this reason, those adventuresome players who decide to implement some or all of these rules modifications should proceed with a certain amount of caution.

MORE OPTIONAL RULES CHANGES

3a. Effect of Russian Anti-tank Units on Attacking Axis Mechanized Units (changes to Rules Case 10.5):

The combat strength of Axis mechanized units that participate in an attack against a Soviet-occupied hex containing one or more anti-tank brigades is unaffected by the presence of the anti-tank unit or units. All other modifications (weather, supply, etc.) to the attacking unit or units’ combat strength still apply, but the presence of a Soviet anti-tank brigade in a defending hex NO LONGER HALVES the attack strength of assaulting Axis mechanized units. Instead, Russian anti-tank units have the following effect on combat: whenever Axis mechanized units participate in an attack against a Soviet stack containing one or more anti-tank units, at least half, rounded up, of all of the attacker’s combat losses (whatever the cause: unsupplied attack, Attacker Exchange, Exchange, ½ Exchange, etc.) must be extracted in the form of armored or mechanized strength points. The single exception to this rule arises in those cases in which the attacking Axis force does not include sufficient mechanized combat factors to satisfy this loss requirement. Such a situation might occur, for example, if the attacking force possessed no full strength German mechanized divisions but did include mechanized kampfgruppen or brigade strength units.

3b. Retreat Limitations on Soviet Anti-Tank Units (‘experimental’ changes to Combat Resolution Rules Case 11.0):

Whenever a Russian anti-tank unit is forced to retreat as a direct result of an Axis attack which, after all Axis combat losses have been removed, includes at least one surviving mechanized unit of any size, the anti-tank brigade may not retreat but is eliminated instead. Please note, however, that this rule applies ONLY to anti-tank brigades: all other types of Soviet units required by the Combat Results Table to retreat — whether infantry, cavalry, mechanized, or artillery — are retreated normally.

Rationale:

Soviet anti-tank gun in the Battle of Kursk

Rules Case 10.5 in WAR IN THE EAST (1Ed.), which stipulates the “halving” effect of Soviet anti-tank units on attacking Axis mechanized forces, appears — based on my own review of engagements involving German armor versus Russian prepared anti-tank defenses during the first three years of the war — to be significantly at odds with the historical record. Of course, it is difficult to know what Jim Dunnigan actually had in mind when he decided to include Soviet anti-tank units in the WAR IN THE EAST counter-mix, but their dramatic, if implausible effect on the Axis armor in the game — particularly when viewed in isolation — is significantly greater than was their actual impact on combat on the Eastern Front. Moreover, the astonishing (almost magical) capabilities attributed by the designer to these Soviet units tend to push the players in odd and usually ahistorical directions.

German panzer division moves up to attack, WWII.

The simulation logic, such as it is, that underpins the standard anti-tank rules seems curious at best, and manipulative at worst. For starters — and for reasons known only to the game designer — the Russian anti-tank counters in WAR IN THE EAST have been designated as brigades, although historically, these units were usually organized as battalions or, more frequently, as independent regiments. In most cases, these specialized contingents were equipped with 45mm, 57mm (starting in 1942), and 76mm anti-tank guns, often with a smattering of marginally-effective anti-tank rifles and even canine-borne anti-tank mines. That being the case, even if one assumes that each Soviet anti-tank brigade represents two full-strength regiments, their “halving” effect on the attack strength of Axis mechanized units still comes perilously close to pure “Dunniganesque” fantasy. That is to say: there is simply no credible evidence based on a careful review of armor vs. anti-tank engagements on the Russian Front that would support the standard “anti-tank effects” rule as originally written; which, in turn, leads to an obvious question: Since it seems clear that the importance of Soviet anti-tank units has been exaggerated in the published rules for WAR IN THE EAST, what legitimate role should these specialized units actually play in the game?

German anti-tank gun in the Battle of Stalingrad.

If we accept history as our guide, the answer necessarily would be a very different one from that envisioned by the game’s designer. Viewed strictly in terms of military doctrine, both the Soviets and the Germans considered the part played by towed anti-tank guns — versus tracked tank-destroyers, for example — as an economical means of channeling and slowing the advance of attacking enemy armor and hence as being highly useful in shaping the battle area. However, neither side considered the battlefield contribution of these mainly static defensive assets to be anywhere near as significant as the critically important role played by Russian anti-tank brigades in the standard game. On the contrary, the Soviet high command (STAVKA) assumed that an anti-tank regiment which had been deployed on suitable terrain and in prepared positions — that is: layered, interlocking defensive zones that included tank obstacles, pre-fabricated concrete block bunkers, and camouflaged, reinforced dugouts — AND WHICH WAS ALSO BACKED UP BY ARTILLERY, should be able to disable between two and three dozen enemy tanks before the regiment either defeated the German assault or was overrun by the attacking enemy force. It should be noted that this number could be higher, but usually only if the local terrain was especially well-suited to the defense. Hence, based on their experiences during the early defensive engagements around Moscow and Leningrad, Red Army commanders seem to have decided that, given optimal battlefield conditions, a well-sited anti-tank regiment should be able to both slow and blunt even a determined German armored assault before such a regiment was, itself, destroyed in place. In short, the battlefield effectiveness of Soviet anti-tank units against enemy armor, while not viewed as being decisive, was still considered to be well worth their investment in men and materiel. Needless-to-say, the loss (even if temporary) of forty-eight to seventy-two tanks — the projected casualties from amongst enemy armored vehicles inflicted by two properly supported Soviet anti-tank regiments — would be a nontrivial price for an Axis assaulting force to pay. Nonetheless, armored losses on this scale typically would not, contrary to the WAR IN THE EAST standard rules, utterly degrade the offensive capabilities of an attacking panzer corps, and most certainly would not significantly reduce the striking power of an entire panzer army.

German Tiger destroys Soviet T34 at Kursk

Probably the most pernicious (and frustrating) effect of the “anti-tank” effects rule — at least in the case of the Campaign Game — is that, after the first few invasion game turns, it makes the printed combat strength of the German mechanized divisions largely irrelevant to Axis offensive play. Instead, what this rule really does is to magnify the utility and combat value of non-motorized German “leg” infantry divisions when they are used to attack Russian prepared positions. Moreover, for all of the Soviet anti-tank brigades’ inflated defensive power, these units, curiously enough, really do not fulfill the one function in the standard game that they actually did serve on the Russian battlefield; that is: to attrite the Wehrmacht’s mechanized strength by destroying or disabling German armored vehicles. Thus, for much of the WAR IN THE EAST Campaign Game, combat losses from amongst the mechanized forces of the two belligerents will usually be disconcertingly low. In fact, both sides will tend to suffer the greater part of their armored casualties when their mechanized units are defending against, rather than attacking the enemy. This means that — for a large part of the game — the mechanized forces available to both sides will tend to be much stronger than was the case historically. Furthermore, despite the fact that this game dynamic is unrealistic,nonetheless, it is the inevitable result of a combat system in which the losses incurred by both the Germans and the Russians when attacking will, with very few exceptions, be extracted from participating infantry units rather than from the mechanized forces directly involved in the battle.

And that's not all: there is another irksome problem with the designer’s somewhat mystical approach to Soviet anti-tank units in WAR IN THE EAST that warrants attention: Dunnigan treats all of these brigades, at least for movement purposes, as being motorized. To be fair, it is true that a certain percentage of the Red Army’s anti-tank regiments were assigned their own organic motor transport; however, from my own reading of the historical record, it appears that a substantial number, if not the majority of these specialized units, depended on horses for their mobility, particularly during the first three years of the war. This factor, when considered along with the standard Soviet practice of aggressive forward deployment of their anti-tank assets, made any kind of organized withdrawal in the face of a powerful enemy armored attack — particularly one supported by air power — exceedingly difficult, if not almost impossible. Individual gunners might escape to fight another day, but the anti-tank guns — whether pulled by horses or by trucks — were most unlikely to survive a retreat across a battlefield dominated by roving enemy armor.

Probable Effects of Recommended Rules Change 3a: 

Substituting the optional (3a) rules case for the standard Soviet “armored effects” rule, as might be expected given the preceding commentary, will fundamentally alter certain key aspects of play in WAR IN THE EAST. For example, players who opt to use the experimental Russian anti-tank rule instead of the regular “halving” version will quickly discover that traditional German and Soviet tactical formulas — beginning with the initial invasion game turns — are more problematical than in the regular game; moreover, adopting this procedural change will also noticeably increase battlefield attrition for both belligerents. One reason for this result, of course, is that incorporating this rules modification into the game significantly enhances the offensive hitting-power of the German mechanized forces, especially during the first few years of the war when the Wehrmacht is still ascendant; in addition, besides improving Axis offensive prospects, it also encourages the Soviets to expand the defensive role of their own mechanized units, as well. Perhaps, most importantly, this change operates to realistically redirect the general flow and tempo of the Campaign Game; and for this reason, it tends to produce — in my opinion, at least — a more historically satisfying model of mobile warfare on the Russian Front. Moreover, my reasons for recommending this rules change will, I believe, become apparent as soon as the very different battlefield effects of the standard and modified versions of the anti-tank rules are compared.

Trench warfare at Leningrad.

The first and most obvious effect on play of the (3a) experimental rules option, as noted earlier, is that it restores the offensive power of the German mechanized arm vis-à-vis virtually any Soviet defensive system that can conceivably be arrayed against it. Of course, it goes without saying that the specific defensive arrangements deployed by the Soviet high command will oftentimes vary across different sections of the game map and these variations will inevitably be influenced by the following factors: the local availability of Soviet rifle strength; the proximity to the frontline of important Axis objectives (i.e., major Russian population centers); the presence or absence of advantageous defensive terrain; and the season of the year. However, even when taking all of these different factors into consideration, the “backbone” of the typical Russian defense — at least when using the regular (printed) anti-tank “armored effects” rule — will still be the multi-layered, easy-to-construct, and economical-to-build “fortified” line. Not surprisingly, using the (3a) change to the anti-tank rules noticeably reduces the effectiveness of this popular Soviet approach, particularly during the critical first two years of the war. If this is indeed the case, and I believe that it is, then it probably makes sense — before moving on to the specific effects on play of the proposed rules change — to briefly revisit the tactics used by both sides when the standard anti-tank rules are in force. To that end, what follows next is a brief analysis of the dominant patterns of offensive and defensive play that shape the flow of a regular game of WAR IN THE EAST, with special attention given to the German summer campaign seasons of 1941, 1942, and 1943.

Battle for Moscow, Soviet Siberian soldiers.

Of course, a number of major engagements in Russia did not occur in summer: the Battle for Moscow (1941-42); the Battle of Rzhev (1942); the Stalingrad Encirclement (1942-43); Manstein’s “Backhand Blow” (1943), to name only a few. And true to the historical record, WAR IN THE EAST has been designed so that the Red Army will largely control the offensive tempo of the game during each and every fall, winter, and spring beginning with the first fall and winter of the war. However, during the summer months of 1941 and 1942, and to a lesser extent, 1943, the game’s basic architecture shifts the offensive advantage back in favor of the Germans. This means that, although the winter battles are important when it comes to furthering Russia’s long-term prospects for victory, the game will, in most cases, actually be won or lost depending on the outcomes of the Axis summer campaigns of 1941 and 42. Thus, the main goal of the Soviet high command, particularly during these critical early years, will be to establish and maintain a defensive posture that can successfully withstand the offensive power of the Germans during that portion of the game when the Axis forces are at their strongest.

Russian soldiers and train.

When it comes down to the actual “nitty-gritty” of play, the most widely-used defensive strategy employed by the Soviets in the standard game — for those readers who are unfamiliar with WAR IN THE EAST — is one that relies on a contiguous line of hexes (preferably as straight as possible) each of which is occupied by a fortified infantry division, a Guards rifle corps (if available), and an anti-tank brigade. This popular linear configuration forms the foundation for the Red Army’s defensive strategy because it guarantees that, in order to capture a Soviet-controlled frontline hex, the attacking Axis divisions must overcome a perfectly-balanced Russian force that possesses a defensive combat strength of 14 factors and an exchange value of 9 factors. Moreover, to insure that the Germans do not achieve a sudden, unexpected breakthrough, the Soviets will virtually always deploy several (two to four) additional belts of static 0-3-0 fortified units (converted 1-4 infantry divisions) immediately behind this first line of continuous strong-points; these, in turn, will typically be backed-up by reserve units of varying types, all of which are close enough to move into the gaps that will inevitably appear either as the frontline lengthens, or as defending Russian units are eliminated in combat. Clearly then, this Soviet defensive strategy — at least when playing using the standard anti-tank rules — presents a formidable barrier to any German advance: the Axis cannot achieve better than 3 to 1 odds against such a prepared position from two hexes and only 5 to 1 (at best) from three hexes. Moreover, this baked-in Soviet ability to restrict Axis battle odds in the standard game is especially critical because, even when using CRT #1 (the most advantageous to the attacker of the game’s four Combat Results Tables), the best combat result (attrition-wise) that the attacker can hope to gain — even at odds of 5 to 1 — is a ½ Exchange. What is even more potentially troublesome to the assaulting Germans is that most of their attacks will have to be conducted at odds of 3 to 1. And battles fought at 3 to 1, with or without friendly air support, offer the attacker no prospect at all of generating an Exchange or ½ Exchange, but, nonetheless, still carry an appreciable risk of the “dreaded” Attacker Exchange result: a combat outcome that requires the attacker to lose factors equal to the face value of the defender’s combat strength, but leaves the defending units in the target hex unaffected.



Soviet 76mm anti-tank artillery

In game terms, this means that Dunnigan’s anti-tank rules virtually guarantee that, after the initial massacre of Soviet frontier forces in June-July 1941, the Wehrmacht’s summer offensives of late 1941 and 1942 will, with very few exceptions, take the shape of extended and bloody, set-piece “slugging matches.” This pattern of play, although it is an inescapable feature of the standard game’s design, is problematical because, historically-speaking, the first protracted set-piece German action of this sort did not actually occur in Russia until Hitler’s failed "Zitadelle" offensive at Kursk in July, 1943. Thus, despite the fact that these types of costly, static engagements seriously undermine the German Army’s strategic goal of conservation of forces, the game’s victory conditions require the Axis to attack (regardless of casualties) during the first few summers of the war. For this reason and in spite of the Wehrmacht’s stacking and early-game CRT advantages, the heavy losses caused by these bloody attrition battles will almost always operate to damage the Germans’ long-term prospects for victory, should the game continue much past the summer of 1943. In short, the German side will have good reason be worried about their steadily accumulating casualties during these largely unavoidable slugging matches, while the Russian view of these bloody summer clashes will typically tend to be a bit more positive. This is because, as these protracted summer battles grind on, the Soviets will typically suffer significantly fewer casualties from among their high value units than will their Axis adversaries; and what losses the Red Army’s forces do suffer will mainly come from their static (fortified) infantry divisions, thanks to the commonly-used Soviet tactic of evacuating units from an exposed position as soon as it can be attacked from three or more hexes (leaving the immobile 0-3-0 behind, of course, to serve as a rear guard).

Soviet howitzers at the Battle of Kursk

Based on my description, thus far, of the tactics most likely to be used in the standard game, it might appear that WAR IN THE EAST players should not expect to see the main effects of the recommended (3a) change to the anti-tank rules until the set-piece defensive engagements of 1941-1943; it turns out, however, that such is really not the case. Incorporating the new, “weaker” version of the anti-tank rules directly undercuts the usefulness of traditional Soviet defensive tactics both during the short Barbarossa Scenario (20 game turns) and also during the early “frontier battles” phase of the Campaign Game (208 turns) by significantly reducing the frontline Russian anti-tank brigades’ ability to impede the advance of the German mechanized forces in the critical first weeks of the Axis invasion. Why and how this change occurs actually derives from two very different features of the WAR IN THE EAST KURSK-based game system: the first is the threat of encirclement posed by enemy mechanized breakthroughs and exploitation movement; the second is the powerful effect of (unfrozen) river lines on combat. Both game elements are important, so let us briefly examine how the anti-tank rules interact with this pair of design features when it comes to the actual play of the game.

Soviet machinegun crew

Any player who has tried one of the many titles based on the KURSK Game System will know that, because of the ability of mechanized units to move both before and after the combat phase, a defense — if it is to be successful — requires the establishment of a second line of units and/or zones of control (ZOCs) behind the defender’s initial line of resistance. The creation of such an impenetrable secondary barrier serves to prevent exploiting mechanized units from passing through any gaps suddenly opened in the non-phasing player’s front as a result of losses incurred during the immediately preceding combat phase; needless-to-say, this “double-line” defensive approach is critical because exploiting mechanized units, if left unimpeded, can slice deep into the non-phasing player’s rear areas to cut supply lines or to encircle exposed sections of the defender’s front. In the case of WAR IN THE EAST, this problem is further complicated by the fact that the rules require that, prior to the start of the game, a sizeable part of the Red Army be set up adjacent to or within a few hexes of the Axis-Soviet frontier; hence, the establishment of a second defensive line is absolutely essential if the Russians are to prevent the bulk of their frontline units from being encircled on the first and second turns of the Barbarossa Scenario or the Campaign Game. To make matters worse, the defender’s second line must be uniformly strong enough to prevent enemy mechanized units from overrunning any part of it during exploitation movement. And because of stacking limitations on overrunning units (only three attacking units may participate in the same overrun), a total of three combat factors per hex is typically required to prevent stacks of enemy armor from rolling over a defender’s position during either the initial or the mechanized movement phases. However, when using the game designer’s original anti-tank rules, a single Soviet anti-tank unit behind a river or, alternatively, an anti-tank brigade stacked in the open with an infantry or cavalry division (a total of only two defense factors) is sufficient to make the target hex immune to an Axis mechanized overrun because of the “halving” effect that the anti-tank unit has on enemy armor.

Germans advance at Kursk, July 1943

Unfortunately for the Russians, this all changes when the (3a) rules modification is substituted for Dunnigan’s original version of the anti-tank rules. Instead, with the new “weaker” rule in place, a Soviet anti-tank brigade — putting aside, for a moment, its 10-hex movement range — becomes no more useful in preventing German overruns than any other (one defense value) unit in the Russian counter-mix. This is no trivial matter, particularly in the north and south sections of the front where — unlike the center — there are fewer forest or swamp hexes on the map to block enemy mechanized ZOCs. Thus, until the Russian forces that were lucky enough to escape the first turn carnage near the Axis-Soviet border can withdraw beyond the reach of a supplied German army, the combination of enemy ZOCs to the front and air interdiction markers in the rear will make it very difficult for the Red Army to extricate many of its less mobile units — particularly its 1-4 rifle and 1-3 cavalry divisions — from the lethal clutches of the onrushing Wehrmacht. To this set of concerns, the Russians can also add another worry; that is: when playing with the post-publication (official SPI errata as of Sept. ’74) “Arms Center Disruption” rule — which stipulates that all on-map arms centers must cease production as soon as the Soviets lose 100 or more units (of any flavor) and may not resume producing arms points until game turn 21 — the increased exposure of Russian units, brought about by this rules change, can often mean that the 100 unit “arms disruption” threshold will be crossed one or even two turns earlier than in the standard game; this represents an increased loss to the Soviets of typically between 20 and 40+ badly-needed arms points.

Soviet women dig anti-tank ditch in front of Leningrad, Summer, 1941.

Moreover, to add insult to injury for the Soviets, it turns out that besides making a successful Russian withdrawal vastly more complicated during the early post-invasion game turns, the substitution of the experimental (3a) rules change also makes it much more difficult to slow or block the initial advance of German mechanized forces in the north and center. The reasons for this are several, but the most important has to do with the initial role of the German infantry. Once the Barbarossa or Campaign Games begin, most of the Wehrmacht’s non-mechanized units will be tasked with liquidating the inevitable scattered pockets of Soviet units that survived the opening Axis attacks but which were unable to escape to the east; hence, Hitler’s panzers will initially be obliged to strike off in pursuit of the fleeing Russians with little or no infantry support. This common early-game dynamic, when playing with the original anti-tank rules, makes it possible for the Red Army to slow or even temporarily halt supplied German mechanized forces in the north and center using a combination of armor, anti-tank units, and river lines. Interestingly, the successful application of this Soviet approach actually depends on several different game elements, but German stacking limits are really the most important contributor to its effectiveness. In WAR IN THE EAST, the most powerful force that the Germans can concentrate in one hex is four 10-8 panzer divisions, for a total of forty attack factors; this is a force that the Soviets cannot hope to match in the early turns of the game. However, an easy-to-muster Russian stack composed of a 2-5 tank brigade, a 3-5 tank brigade, and a 0-1-10 anti-tank brigade (a total of six printed defense factors) — even if in the open — presents an attacking German mechanized force with an effective defense strength of twelve factors; more importantly, the same Soviet stack defending against an unsupplied German mechanized force or deployed behind a river is equivalent to twenty-four very intimidating (and 4 to 1 proof) defense factors. This is because the attack strength of the panzers and panzer grenadiers, in every one of these examples, is halved (in some cases, multiple times) before combat is resolved. In game terms, this means that the Russians can use this tactic to slow the progress of both Army Group Center’s and Army Group North’s mechanized units when it matters most. And because even the gain of a few extra turns of delay can buy enough time for arriving Russian reinforcements to fortify much, if not all, of the ground in front of both Moscow and Leningrad, this rule seriously impacts the Red Army’s defensive options during the critical summer game turns of 1941.

Soviet POWs under German guard, sumer 1941

What all this means is that, whether viewed in the context of the initial frontier battles of summer 1941, or with an eye towards the wider impact of this (3a) rules change during the first few years of the war, Russian losses (along with those of the German mechanized arm) will inevitably increase, and increase substantially. The other notable effect of this rules modification is that it, at least partially, restores the importance of terrain in shaping the battle area: river lines, especially, become much more important to the Russians when the anti-tank ‘halving’ rule is discarded and replaced by its “weaker” alternative. Stated differently: the halving effect of rivers — at least when it comes to Soviet defensive play — will, in most cases, become a more important defensive consideration for the Russians than limiting the number of hexes available to the attacker. Thus, the “ruler-straight” and “snake dance” Soviet defensive configurations that regularly appear in the standard game will tend — as a direct result of this rules change — to give way to the more meandering frontlines that actually characterized the historical campaign.

Last but not least, of course, is the increased attrition that this change will introduce into the dynamic of the WAR IN THE EAST game system. Simply stated, the Soviets will, because of this change, suffer much higher losses among their “high value” units than in the standard game; however, just as importantly, the Germans will also be forced to accept significantly higher casualties among their mechanized forces if they choose, as they almost certainly will, to commit their panzer and panzer grenadier divisions to high-odds assaults against the Russian line. Thus, this rules change will tend to produce — typically, by early 1942 — a battlefield environment in which the orders of battle of the two opposing armies will be both weaker and more brittle than in the standard game.

Probable Effects of Recommended Rules Change 3b:

In the standard game of WAR IN THE EAST, the Soviet side usually constructs about forty-five to fifty anti-tank brigades during the first months of the war, and then never builds another one of these units for the rest of the game. This, in its own way, is just as ridiculously unrealistic, from a historical standpoint, as the already-railed against, but nonetheless typical game phenomenon of German panzer divisions operating for much of the war without (figuratively speaking) ever suffering so much as a scratch as a result of combat operations.

Soviet WWII tank production factory

The adoption of the 3b rules change will, like its 3a “cousin,” affect the trajectory of the game (particularly, the Campaign version) in several important ways. First, it creates a battlefield role, albeit a small one, for the otherwise largely useless Axis allied mechanized units. The second but most immediate effect of this change, not surprisingly, will be to dramatically increase losses among Russian anti-tank units. This, in turn, will mean that the Soviets, if they wish to maintain a reservoir of these “weakened” but still useful brigades, will have to devote a fairly significant number of arms points to their construction for at least the first two to two-and-a-half years of the war. In terms of Soviet force levels, both in the short and in the long term, this is an important change. In the short term, it means that more Soviet Production capacity (Training Center tracks), along with more personnel and arms points, will have to be directed towards the construction of anti-tank brigades, particularly during the summers of 1941 and 42. Long term, of course, the diversion of increased numbers of scarce Production resources towards the construction of purely defensive units means, in turn, that the Russians will not be able to construct as many of the expensive (especially, in arms points) offensive units as they would otherwise be able to produce in the standard game. In short, both 1942 and 1943, because of the 3b rules change will tend to see a Soviet combat force with fewer tank corps, artillery corps, or air units than would typically be the case. The end result of this change therefore will often be a situation, particularly during the summer of 1942, in which the Soviet position is much more precarious than in the standard game: a strategic situation, in short, in which an Axis decisive victory is still possible, even in this, the second year of the war.

CONCLUSION

More Recommended WAR IN THE EAST Rules Changes are Coming Soon:

Soviet Anti-tank Hunters with mine dogs

This essay is the second of several that will propose a collection of — in my opinion, at least — challenging and historically-grounded changes to the standard rules for the first edition of WAR IN THE EAST. My goal, in presenting these rules alternatives, as I indicated earlier, is to rekindle a little interest in this great old title, and perhaps, to spur a few players to do a little experimenting with the game on their own. That being said, Part III of this series will — when I get around to publishing it — offer yet a few more recommended changes to the standard WIE Campaign Game rules that, hopefully, will compliment those presented here. Of course you can’t please everyone, so for those readers who don’t like any of the recommendations that I have put forward thus far, I urge them to do a little rules tinkering on their own. While it is rarely worthwhile to radically alter a simulation’s basic design architecture, sometimes one or two small tweaks can have a very pleasing effect on a game and its playability. And when looking for rules inspiration, the historical record is almost always a great source for new ideas.

Finally, for those players who prefer to leave the ‘rules writing’ to others, I want to repeat my earlier warning: some of the rules modifications recommended in this set of essays have been tested fairly extensively, but some have not (much like most commercially-produced games). For this reason, those readers who are tempted to actually experiment with one or both of the above optional rules are urged to proceed with caution; some of the changes that have been recommended in Part I, as already noted, will have only a modest effect on the game, but the two listed in this installment have the potential to affect play and play-balance significantly. Consider this “a word to the wise.”