Map and Counters

A Few Recommended Rules Changes for WAR IN THE EAST

INTRODUCTION

OPTIONAL RULES CHANGES

1a. Railroad Repair Units (changes to Rules Case 6.6):

German military train.

At the start of the Campaign Game, instead of the three units stipulated by the standard rules, the Axis receives four (4) Railroad Repair Units; these repair units must start the game on the SW map section, west of the “Barbarossa” Start Line. The Russians begin the Campaign Game — as in the standard game — with no railroad repair units on the map; thus, the Russians, if they wish to bring any of these units into play, must build new railroad repair units using the Soviet Production process. Railroad Repair Units (for both sides) are used to repair “cut” rail lines and to convert enemy rail lines to friendly use for both rail movement and supply purposes. These different operations are affected by the current ownership of the rail line being repaired, and the weather conditions at the time of the repair. That being said, during the initial movement phase of all clear, mud, and snow weather game turns, both German and Russian repair units may move a single hex along a connected rail line, repairing or converting the just-entered rail hex and linking it to the rail net of the repair unit’s owner. This means that, unlike the standard game, BOTH the Germans and the Russians may repair rail lines during snow game turns. In addition to the regular repair procedure outlined above, during the mechanized movement phase of all clear weather (only) game turns, both German and Russian Railroad Repair Units may move one additional hex along a connected rail line and thereby repair or convert a second rail hex during the same turn as the first; this second, mechanized phase repair move, however, can only take place if the newly-repaired rail line began the game turn as part of a friendly rail system. In essence, this rule change allows both German and Russian repair units to repair two adjacent friendly rail hexes that have previously been cut by enemy ground movement.

1b. Optional (Experimental) Rules Change: Repair of “Neutral” Rail Lines (changes to Rules Case 6.6):

T34 Rail-borne tanks bound for the front, WWII.

All other railroad rules stipulated for use in the standard Campaign Game of THE WAR IN THE EAST remain exactly the same. Thus, except for the specific changes outlined above, all other regular game rules which pertain both to Rail Movement and to Rail Road Repair Units, as well as all rules pertaining to the Finnish Rail System remain unchanged.

Rationale:

European gauge versus Russian broad gauge rail.

Probably no other single rules case has ever been the target of as much criticism and outright scorn on the part of the gaming community as the Railroad Repair Rules in WAR IN THE EAST (1^st Ed.). Although this single rules section governs one of the most important elements in the simulation, it is mentioned only briefly (one short paragraph) in the game’s “Designer’s Notes.” The folks at SPI may not have initially thought that this issue deserved much attention, but their customers quickly reacted with a storm of disagreement. Controversy over this design feature, in fact, surfaced almost immediately after the game was published; and rightly so. Not only did Jim Dunnigan get his facts wrong when he tried to defend his perverse and utterly implausible treatment of railroad repair in WIE, but he and his small band of supporters clung to this position even though both the historical and theoretical evidence clearly showed that virtually every one of the main points subsequently offered as justification for the Railroad Repair rules was invalid. And in the interests of setting the record straight, what follows are just a few of the counterarguments that quickly bounced back in rebuttal to SPI’s main reasons — at least, officially — for insisting on the unrealistic, unhistorical, and needlessly restrictive WIE railroad repair rules, in the first place.

Russian railroad tracks.

First, counter to the Dunnigan clique’s tired old “regauging” argument, significant sections of the rail system close to the frontier (specifically, most of the railroads in the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bukovina, and Bessarabia) were compatible (rail width-wise) with the railroads of Western Europe. In actual fact, the rail lines in these recently-occupied Soviet territories had been laid according to the “European” rail standard and not the wider “Russian gauge” of Dunnigan’s fantasies. Second, the completely arbitrary limit of three German Railroad Repair Units at the start of the Campaign Game makes no sense at all. While the types of railroad operations represented by these units do require dedicated rolling stock, as well as skilled personnel to act in supervisory roles, their main requirement is, and always has been, for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers. To put the preposterousness of Dunnigan's repair rule into its proper perspective, during the historical period covered by the game, a work gang of twelve men would, under normal conditions, have been expected to regauge about one mile of track per day; normal practice, not surprisingly, would thus have called for a large number of separate semi-independent crews working at intervals along a rail line to repair a much longer stretch of track. Given the record of the Third Reich’s treatment of captive populations and even ignoring the actual historical record, it is inconceivable that the Germans would have showed the slightest hesitation when it came to rounding up as many slave laborers as they felt were needed to advance their railheads east as rapidly as possible.

German panzer division advances in Russia.

Moreover, the restriction on Axis (only) railroad repair during snow months is another rule that has no basis in fact. The idea that the Soviets would force work gangs to repair rail lines in the sub-zero weather of the Russian winter, but that, somehow, the more-humane Germans would not, is ludicrous on its face.

Third, and contrary to the designer’s guesswork regarding the operations actually required to effect rail line repair or conversion, the greatest hindrance to repair — then and now — is not the laying of new ties and rails, but the repair of roadbeds, bridges, trestles, and tunnels. Thus, besides the construction of railroad bridges and the digging of tunnels, the single most significant obstacle to actually building a railroad is not the physical process of setting down track, but the surveying, clearing, grading, and preparation of the roadbed on which the track will ultimately be laid. The soldiers of the withdrawing Red Army did (as the defenders of the original repair rules argue) burn trestles, bridges, and railroad ties; and they did bend rails and destroy rolling stock; but retreating Red Army units rarely, if ever, had either the time or the equipment necessary to seriously damage the roadbed, itself.

Fourth, the argument that the Germans failed to allocate sufficient railroad repair assets at the start of “Barbarossa,” because they anticipated a short military campaign, also fails to hold up to close scrutiny. While it is true that the OKH did not plan for extensive ground operations past the autumn of 1941, they did plan for a permanent occupation of all of European Russia west of the Urals. Also, because Hitler viewed the war against the Soviet Union both in ideological and economic terms, a large-scale, functioning rail system within occupied Russia was seen by the Germans as a critically important adjunct to the long-term goal of robbing the Soviet Union of its resources and of then transporting them west to the Reich.

In the final analysis, for all of the excuses and designer “double-talk,” the standard game’s Railroad Repair Rules were nothing more than an “outcome-based” design trick on Dunnigan’s part to limit the depth of the German offensive during the first year of the war. Clearly, the designer had decided, in the design process, that he did not want the Germans to capture Moscow in the course of the first summer. In addition, he had also decided, it would seem, exactly where he wanted the frontline to form when the fall rains finally stalled Hitler's armies in 1941; thus, the ridiculous and unhistorical restrictions on German railroad repair units, in combination with the game’s regular supply rules, pretty much guaranteed Dunnigan the game results that he wanted.

Russians in trench, Battle of Leningrad.

The problem with modifying the Railroad Repair rules in WAR IN THE EAST is that a great deal of the game’s design architecture is based on certain assumptions intrinsic to this rules set. Hence, the first set of (1a) rules changes recommended above are comparatively modest. The addition of a fourth German Railroad Repair Unit and the new-found ability of the Germans to repair rail lines during snow games turns will have little appreciable effect on the outcome of “Barbarossa.” At most, these rules changes provide the Axis with a little more flexibility with their supply lines during the early game turns and better supply coverage for their frontline units during the later stages of the first Russian winter. The second (1b), ‘Experimental’ rules case, which pertains specifically to the Axis repair of railroads in Soviet-occupied “neutral” territories, is a whole different matter. Although this ‘optional’ rules set can be justified purely on historical grounds, its actual use in the game should, none-the-less, probably be approached by interested players with extreme caution. Adopting this second set of rules will have little effect on the southern section of the front, but will have profound consequences for the combat operations of German Army Groups North and Center. Thus, to say that the use of the ‘1b’ experimental rules makes things difficult for the Russians, particularly during the critical first summer of 1941, is probably to make a gross understatement.

Probable Effects of Recommended Changes:

Kleines Kettenkraftrad, driving through mud on the Eastern Front.

The likely effects on play from adopting the first (1a) set of changes to the Railroad Repair rules, as already noted, will be relatively small. German operations during the first summer will see little, if any, real impact from these minor adjustments; and the frontline positions of the opposing armies will pretty much mirror those of the standard game. On the other hand, German supply problems, particularly during the late winter and early spring of 1942, will be considerably eased; and, because of this fact, the effects of the inevitable Russian winter attacks will be partially blunted, especially during the last few weeks of the Russian counteroffensive. One other benefit to the Axis of this rules change worth noting is that, because of the addition of an extra repair unit and the ability to repair rail lines during snow turns, the Germans will be able to start creating a few north-south rail lines so as to provide some capacity for lateral movement of Axis forces in the summer of 1942.

Axis winter dead, 1941-42; the coldest winter in 40 years.

In contrast to the first set of “minor” rules changes, the probable effects on play from the adoption of the second (1b) ‘Experimental’ rules set will be as great as the effects from the first are modest. To begin with, Soviet units in the south will find themselves under more pressure, because of the “neutral” repair rule, than they would be otherwise: Kharkov and the Crimea, for instance, will come within range of supplied Axis attacks a few turns earlier than in the standard game; this, however, is only a minor nuisance compared to the Axis threats that will quickly develop along other sections of the Russian Front. And unfortunately for the Soviets, it is in front of Leningrad and Moscow that the Red Army will encounter its greatest defensive challenges. Moreover, because of the nature of these new Axis threats, a number of previously effective Red Army responses to “Barbarossa” will prove problematical at best and suicidal at worst.

German soldiers, Battle of Leningrad, 1941.

Consider just one well-known, if notorious, example: Oktay Oztunali’s Russian “Quick Step” Strategy (Moves nr. 20, April/May 1975) which calls for an immediate and complete Soviet withdrawal — during the critically-important first weeks of the war — to a final defensive line beyond the farthest reach of Axis supply in summer, 1941. Unfortunately for the Russians, the accelerated advance of the Axis railheads in the north and center really makes the standard version of the Oztunali “quick step” defensive approach totally unworkable. Such a precipitate withdrawal, given the rapid Axis conversion of the “neutral” Baltic States’ railroad hexes to friendly use, would necessitate the premature abandonment of Leningrad because the westernmost hex of the city could come within Axis supply range as early as game turn seven. This means that, if the Russians do decide to fight for Leningrad, they must immediately begin to establish a solid defense along the Luga River in the first few game turns; and further, they must then reinforce this first defensive line as quickly as possible with a series of strongly-garrisoned fortified zones extending all the way back to and through Leningrad, itself. It goes without saying that neither the withdrawal nor the ‘die-hard defense of the city’ options, seen from the Soviet standpoint, are particularly appealing.

Battle of Moscow, first successful Russian counterattack.

Things are slightly better for the Soviets in the center. This is because, Moscow, unlike Leningrad, will not come within supply range of the Wehrmacht during the first sixteen weeks of the German offensive. The “neutral” railroads in Poland simply do not extend far enough to the east to allow supplied attacks against the Soviet capital during the first summer of the war. This does not mean, however, that this sector of the front can be neglected by the Soviet high command. On the contrary, the Russians will almost certainly have to begin strengthening Moscow’s defenses well to the west of the city if they are to have any chance of holding the Soviet capital through the second summer. In short, the Russians will have to make an early and firm strategic commitment to hold the Germans as far west as possible; and once they do, they will have to stick to it — even in the face of heavy losses — if they are to prevent the Wehrmacht from gaining an advanced lodgment that would place the Germans too close to the Soviet capital at the outset of the Axis ’42 campaign season. Obviously then, fighting will be both bloodier and more prolonged if this version of the Railroad Repair rules are adopted. And although this second (1b) rules set will certainly inject the game with greater excitement and more historicity, it is still not for the faint of heart. Preliminary play-testing through 1941 suggests that, while this rules option does not make the game unplayable, it does make it highly volatile. Moreover, because the adoption of the “neutral” repair rules set inevitably will place a great deal of pressure on the Red Army during the summers of both 1941 and 42, it is strongly recommended that — if this rules set is used — that the strongest, most-experienced players manage the Soviet defenses. And even then, the Russian commanders will probably need every bit of skill and cunning that they can muster to prevent the game from turning into an Axis “romp”.

2. Kampfgruppen and Battlegroups (changes to Rules Case 10.3):

Russian guard lights two German POWs cigarettes.

The formation of Kampfgruppen or Battlegroups (hereafter referred to as BGs) upon the elimination of German infantry divisions or Soviet rifle corps is no longer automatic. Instead, a die is rolled for each infantry division or rifle corps destroyed in combat and — depending on the affected unit’s circumstances, nationality, and type — may or may not result in a BG being formed. Note that this rules change does not affect armored or mechanized divisions or corps; nor does it pertain to those German infantry divisions reduced to BGs to satisfy the “First Winter” rule; in both of these situations, the affected units always form BGs. In all other cases, the aforementioned rules changes apply. The process for actually determining infantry Kampfgruppe and Battlegroup formation is, as follows:

a) All regular German infantry divisions (6-5s) and Finnish divisions (4-5s) form a BG on a die roll of 1 to 6.
b) All Soviet Guards rifle corps (5-5s) form a BG on a die roll of 1 to 5.
c) All German security divisions (6-3s) and regular Soviet rifle corps (4-4s) form a BG on a die roll of 1 to 4.

In addition to the above changes in the procedure used to determine BG formation, individual BG die rolls may also be subject to certain adverse adjustments. These die roll modifications (DRMs) are cumulative and are applied in the following combat situations:

a) +1 DRM: If the unit is eliminated while defending against an attack (Finnish divisions defending in “Old Finland” are not affected).
b) +1 DRM: If the unit is eliminated (whether attacking or defending) while unsupplied.
c) +1 DRM: If a German (only) unit is eliminated (whether attacking or defending) during game turns 21-40 (the first Russian winter), inclusive.

Rationale:

Russian Siberian soldiers, Battle of Moscow.

Kampfgruppen and Battlegroups represent — at least, in game terms — that cadre of officers, NCOs, and seasoned veterans around which a combat unit can, with the infusion of fresh manpower and new equipment, be restored to full effectiveness. Needless-to-say, the survival of this core manpower component during heavy or prolonged fighting is a function of a variety of factors; the most important of which are: training, leadership, logistical support, experience, and morale. And it is because of the effects of several critical factors that the recommended rules for German and Russian BG formation vary. To explain why this is so, a brief historical detour is probably in order.

Russian troops on the march, December 1941.

At the outset of “Barbarossa,” the German army — having already fought victorious military campaigns in Poland, Denmark, Norway, France and the Low Countries, and the Balkans — was unequalled in terms of operational leadership and doctrine, morale, unit cohesion, and combat effectiveness. The opposing Red Army, in contrast, was in disarray. Stalin’s senseless and brutal purge of the professional officer corps had stripped the Soviet army, not only of almost all of its senior leadership, but also of many of its most experienced intermediate-level commanders. The consequences of this ill-considered policy were soon exposed, in the course of the Russo-Finnish War, both to the Soviet Union’s political leadership, and to interested eyes in Berlin. The war with the Finns lasted barely five months, yet it still managed to present an unflattering image of the Red Army’s battle-worthiness. Russian forces finally managed, by March of 1940, to grind out a victory of sorts against the outnumbered Finns, but, much to the shock of Stalin and his small clique of loyal generals in Moscow, the war’s cost in Soviet battlefield casualties, and destroyed and lost equipment had been horrific. Moreover, the miserable performance of the Red Army in its campaign against the Finns was not lost on Hitler or the Oberkommando des Heeres. To make matters worse, the rapid collapse of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940 convinced the Soviet high command to abandon its original strategy for a “linear defense” of Russia’s western frontier, and to adopt, instead, a “defense in depth.” Unfortunately for the Russians, this hastily-planned redeployment of frontier forces was still underway when Hitler struck on 22 June, 1941.



Russian column on the move in winter, WWII.

Obviously, the German and Finnish advantages in overall unit quality at the onset of the war were pronounced; just as important, however, the historical record suggests that this advantage in organization and unit cohesion persisted right up until the end of the war. The “die roll modifiers” are based on the more general effects of different types of combat operations. For example, it is much more likely that a defending unit that has been overwhelmed by an attacker would be completely destroyed, than it is that an attacking formation would press an assault to the point that its core infrastructure of equipment, combat leaders, and veteran soldiers would be wiped-out. On the other hand, the increased likelihood that either an unsupplied attacking or defending unit would lose its unit cohesion, particularly when engaged in prolonged combat, seems, on its face, to be reasonable. Finally, the effects of the first Russian winter on German combat operations are well enough documented that they really require no elaboration. Suffice to say that the Germans were both unprepared and ill-equipped for the conditions that they encountered during the Russian winter of 1941-42, and that they paid an exorbitant price for their triumphalism and for the short-sighted planning that resulted from it.

Probable Effects of Recommended Changes:

Nazi graves near Leningrad, 1943.

Both sides should see a lot more casualties as a significant number of Russian rifle corps (particularly during the first two summers) and German divisions (during the first winter and then resuming in 1943-45) go straight into the “dead pile” without forming Battlegroups or Kampfgruppen. For the Russians, these additional infantry losses will typically require a heavier than usual investment in both rifle division construction and conversion, at least until the winter of 1943; for the Germans, this means that the Rebuilding Track will fill up very quickly, and will pretty much stay full for the balance of the Campaign Game. For both sides, armies will be weaker, and this, in turn, will mean that frontlines will be thinner and reserve formations will be less plentiful in 1942 than in the standard game. Moreover, because of the across-the-board reduction in unit density brought about by this rules change, the possibility of breakthroughs will be increased; therefore both sides will have to tend very carefully to their defensive arrangements, particularly if they face a determined and well-supported enemy offensive. Lastly, in and of itself, this rules change probably won’t break the WAR IN THE EAST Campaign Game wide open, but it will insure that both sides will, at different stages in the war, face much thornier than usual defensive challenges as the game wears on.

CONCLUSION TO PART I

German cavalry, WWII

More recommended WAR IN THE EAST rules changes are coming soon. This essay is the first of several that will propose a collection of — in my opinion, at least — challenging and historically-grounded changes to the standard rules for the first edition of WAR IN THE EAST. My goal, in presenting these rules alternatives, is to rekindle a little interest in this great old title, and perhaps, to spur a few players to do a little experimenting with the game on their own. That being said, Part II of this series will — when I get around to publishing it — offer yet a few more recommended changes to the standard WIE Campaign Game rules that, hopefully, will complement those presented here. Of course you can’t please everyone, so for those readers who don’t like any of the recommendations that I have put forward thus far, I urge them to do a little rules tinkering on their own. While it is rarely worthwhile to radically alter a simulation’s basic design architecture, sometimes one or two small tweaks can have a very pleasing effect on a game and its playability. And when looking for rules inspiration, the historical record is almost always a great source for new ideas.

Finally, for those players who prefer to leave the ‘rules writing’ to others, I offer a word of warning: some of the rules modifications recommended herein have been tested fairly extensively, but some have not (much like most commercially-produced games). For this reason, those readers who are tempted to actually experiment with one or more of these optional rules are urged to proceed with caution; some changes, as already noted, will have only a modest effect on the game, but others have the potential to affect play and play-balance significantly. Consider this “a word to the wise.”

Recommended Reading

See my blog post Book Reviews of these titles which are strongly recommended for those readers interested in further historical background, or just go ahead and get the books:

Book Review:  Battle of Kursk , Book Review: Panzer Battles, Book Review:  German Army 1933-1945
, Book Review:  Genius for War, the German Army ,Book Review:  Command Decisions