Map and Counters

A Few Recommended Rules Changes for WAR IN THE EAST

INTRODUCTION

OPTIONAL RULES CHANGES

1a. Railroad Repair Units (changes to Rules Case 6.6):

German military train.

At the start of the Campaign Game, instead of the three units stipulated by the standard rules, the Axis receives four (4) Railroad Repair Units; these repair units must start the game on the SW map section, west of the “Barbarossa” Start Line. The Russians begin the Campaign Game — as in the standard game — with no railroad repair units on the map; thus, the Russians, if they wish to bring any of these units into play, must build new railroad repair units using the Soviet Production process. Railroad Repair Units (for both sides) are used to repair “cut” rail lines and to convert enemy rail lines to friendly use for both rail movement and supply purposes. These different operations are affected by the current ownership of the rail line being repaired, and the weather conditions at the time of the repair. That being said, during the initial movement phase of all clear, mud, and snow weather game turns, both German and Russian repair units may move a single hex along a connected rail line, repairing or converting the just-entered rail hex and linking it to the rail net of the repair unit’s owner. This means that, unlike the standard game, BOTH the Germans and the Russians may repair rail lines during snow game turns. In addition to the regular repair procedure outlined above, during the mechanized movement phase of all clear weather (only) game turns, both German and Russian Railroad Repair Units may move one additional hex along a connected rail line and thereby repair or convert a second rail hex during the same turn as the first; this second, mechanized phase repair move, however, can only take place if the newly-repaired rail line began the game turn as part of a friendly rail system. In essence, this rule change allows both German and Russian repair units to repair two adjacent friendly rail hexes that have previously been cut by enemy ground movement.

1b. Optional (Experimental) Rules Change: Repair of “Neutral” Rail Lines (changes to Rules Case 6.6):

T34 Rail-borne tanks bound for the front, WWII.

All other railroad rules stipulated for use in the standard Campaign Game of THE WAR IN THE EAST remain exactly the same. Thus, except for the specific changes outlined above, all other regular game rules which pertain both to Rail Movement and to Rail Road Repair Units, as well as all rules pertaining to the Finnish Rail System remain unchanged.

Rationale:

European gauge versus Russian broad gauge rail.

Probably no other single rules case has ever been the target of as much criticism and outright scorn on the part of the gaming community as the Railroad Repair Rules in WAR IN THE EAST (1^st Ed.). Although this single rules section governs one of the most important elements in the simulation, it is mentioned only briefly (one short paragraph) in the game’s “Designer’s Notes.” The folks at SPI may not have initially thought that this issue deserved much attention, but their customers quickly reacted with a storm of disagreement. Controversy over this design feature, in fact, surfaced almost immediately after the game was published; and rightly so. Not only did Jim Dunnigan get his facts wrong when he tried to defend his perverse and utterly implausible treatment of railroad repair in WIE, but he and his small band of supporters clung to this position even though both the historical and theoretical evidence clearly showed that virtually every one of the main points subsequently offered as justification for the Railroad Repair rules was invalid. And in the interests of setting the record straight, what follows are just a few of the counterarguments that quickly bounced back in rebuttal to SPI’s main reasons — at least, officially — for insisting on the unrealistic, unhistorical, and needlessly restrictive WIE railroad repair rules, in the first place.

Russian railroad tracks.

First, counter to the Dunnigan clique’s tired old “regauging” argument, significant sections of the rail system close to the frontier (specifically, most of the railroads in the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bukovina, and Bessarabia) were compatible (rail width-wise) with the railroads of Western Europe. In actual fact, the rail lines in these recently-occupied Soviet territories had been laid according to the “European” rail standard and not the wider “Russian gauge” of Dunnigan’s fantasies. Second, the completely arbitrary limit of three German Railroad Repair Units at the start of the Campaign Game makes no sense at all. While the types of railroad operations represented by these units do require dedicated rolling stock, as well as skilled personnel to act in supervisory roles, their main requirement is, and always has been, for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers. To put the preposterousness of Dunnigan's repair rule into its proper perspective, during the historical period covered by the game, a work gang of twelve men would, under normal conditions, have been expected to regauge about one mile of track per day; normal practice, not surprisingly, would thus have called for a large number of separate semi-independent crews working at intervals along a rail line to repair a much longer stretch of track. Given the record of the Third Reich’s treatment of captive populations and even ignoring the actual historical record, it is inconceivable that the Germans would have showed the slightest hesitation when it came to rounding up as many slave laborers as they felt were needed to advance their railheads east as rapidly as possible.

German panzer division advances in Russia.

Moreover, the restriction on Axis (only) railroad repair during snow months is another rule that has no basis in fact. The idea that the Soviets would force work gangs to repair rail lines in the sub-zero weather of the Russian winter, but that, somehow, the more-humane Germans would not, is ludicrous on its face.

Third, and contrary to the designer’s guesswork regarding the operations actually required to effect rail line repair or conversion, the greatest hindrance to repair — then and now — is not the laying of new ties and rails, but the repair of roadbeds, bridges, trestles, and tunnels. Thus, besides the construction of railroad bridges and the digging of tunnels, the single most significant obstacle to actually building a railroad is not the physical process of setting down track, but the surveying, clearing, grading, and preparation of the roadbed on which the track will ultimately be laid. The soldiers of the withdrawing Red Army did (as the defenders of the original repair rules argue) burn trestles, bridges, and railroad ties; and they did bend rails and destroy rolling stock; but retreating Red Army units rarely, if ever, had either the time or the equipment necessary to seriously damage the roadbed, itself.

Fourth, the argument that the Germans failed to allocate sufficient railroad repair assets at the start of “Barbarossa,” because they anticipated a short military campaign, also fails to hold up to close scrutiny. While it is true that the OKH did not plan for extensive ground operations past the autumn of 1941, they did plan for a permanent occupation of all of European Russia west of the Urals. Also, because Hitler viewed the war against the Soviet Union both in ideological and economic terms, a large-scale, functioning rail system within occupied Russia was seen by the Germans as a critically important adjunct to the long-term goal of robbing the Soviet Union of its resources and of then transporting them west to the Reich.

In the final analysis, for all of the excuses and designer “double-talk,” the standard game’s Railroad Repair Rules were nothing more than an “outcome-based” design trick on Dunnigan’s part to limit the depth of the German offensive during the first year of the war. Clearly, the designer had decided, in the design process, that he did not want the Germans to capture Moscow in the course of the first summer. In addition, he had also decided, it would seem, exactly where he wanted the frontline to form when the fall rains finally stalled Hitler's armies in 1941; thus, the ridiculous and unhistorical restrictions on German railroad repair units, in combination with the game’s regular supply rules, pretty much guaranteed Dunnigan the game results that he wanted.

Russians in trench, Battle of Leningrad.

The problem with modifying the Railroad Repair rules in WAR IN THE EAST is that a great deal of the game’s design architecture is based on certain assumptions intrinsic to this rules set. Hence, the first set of (1a) rules changes recommended above are comparatively modest. The addition of a fourth German Railroad Repair Unit and the new-found ability of the Germans to repair rail lines during snow games turns will have little appreciable effect on the outcome of “Barbarossa.” At most, these rules changes provide the Axis with a little more flexibility with their supply lines during the early game turns and better supply coverage for their frontline units during the later stages of the first Russian winter. The second (1b), ‘Experimental’ rules case, which pertains specifically to the Axis repair of railroads in Soviet-occupied “neutral” territories, is a whole different matter. Although this ‘optional’ rules set can be justified purely on historical grounds, its actual use in the game should, none-the-less, probably be approached by interested players with extreme caution. Adopting this second set of rules will have little effect on the southern section of the front, but will have profound consequences for the combat operations of German Army Groups North and Center. Thus, to say that the use of the ‘1b’ experimental rules makes things difficult for the Russians, particularly during the critical first summer of 1941, is probably to make a gross understatement.

Probable Effects of Recommended Changes:

Kleines Kettenkraftrad, driving through mud on the Eastern Front.

The likely effects on play from adopting the first (1a) set of changes to the Railroad Repair rules, as already noted, will be relatively small. German operations during the first summer will see little, if any, real impact from these minor adjustments; and the frontline positions of the opposing armies will pretty much mirror those of the standard game. On the other hand, German supply problems, particularly during the late winter and early spring of 1942, will be considerably eased; and, because of this fact, the effects of the inevitable Russian winter attacks will be partially blunted, especially during the last few weeks of the Russian counteroffensive. One other benefit to the Axis of this rules change worth noting is that, because of the addition of an extra repair unit and the ability to repair rail lines during snow turns, the Germans will be able to start creating a few north-south rail lines so as to provide some capacity for lateral movement of Axis forces in the summer of 1942.

Axis winter dead, 1941-42; the coldest winter in 40 years.

In contrast to the first set of “minor” rules changes, the probable effects on play from the adoption of the second (1b) ‘Experimental’ rules set will be as great as the effects from the first are modest. To begin with, Soviet units in the south will find themselves under more pressure, because of the “neutral” repair rule, than they would be otherwise: Kharkov and the Crimea, for instance, will come within range of supplied Axis attacks a few turns earlier than in the standard game; this, however, is only a minor nuisance compared to the Axis threats that will quickly develop along other sections of the Russian Front. And unfortunately for the Soviets, it is in front of Leningrad and Moscow that the Red Army will encounter its greatest defensive challenges. Moreover, because of the nature of these new Axis threats, a number of previously effective Red Army responses to “Barbarossa” will prove problematical at best and suicidal at worst.

German soldiers, Battle of Leningrad, 1941.

Consider just one well-known, if notorious, example: Oktay Oztunali’s Russian “Quick Step” Strategy (Moves nr. 20, April/May 1975) which calls for an immediate and complete Soviet withdrawal — during the critically-important first weeks of the war — to a final defensive line beyond the farthest reach of Axis supply in summer, 1941. Unfortunately for the Russians, the accelerated advance of the Axis railheads in the north and center really makes the standard version of the Oztunali “quick step” defensive approach totally unworkable. Such a precipitate withdrawal, given the rapid Axis conversion of the “neutral” Baltic States’ railroad hexes to friendly use, would necessitate the premature abandonment of Leningrad because the westernmost hex of the city could come within Axis supply range as early as game turn seven. This means that, if the Russians do decide to fight for Leningrad, they must immediately begin to establish a solid defense along the Luga River in the first few game turns; and further, they must then reinforce this first defensive line as quickly as possible with a series of strongly-garrisoned fortified zones extending all the way back to and through Leningrad, itself. It goes without saying that neither the withdrawal nor the ‘die-hard defense of the city’ options, seen from the Soviet standpoint, are particularly appealing.

Battle of Moscow, first successful Russian counterattack.

Things are slightly better for the Soviets in the center. This is because, Moscow, unlike Leningrad, will not come within supply range of the Wehrmacht during the first sixteen weeks of the German offensive. The “neutral” railroads in Poland simply do not extend far enough to the east to allow supplied attacks against the Soviet capital during the first summer of the war. This does not mean, however, that this sector of the front can be neglected by the Soviet high command. On the contrary, the Russians will almost certainly have to begin strengthening Moscow’s defenses well to the west of the city if they are to have any chance of holding the Soviet capital through the second summer. In short, the Russians will have to make an early and firm strategic commitment to hold the Germans as far west as possible; and once they do, they will have to stick to it — even in the face of heavy losses — if they are to prevent the Wehrmacht from gaining an advanced lodgment that would place the Germans too close to the Soviet capital at the outset of the Axis ’42 campaign season. Obviously then, fighting will be both bloodier and more prolonged if this version of the Railroad Repair rules are adopted. And although this second (1b) rules set will certainly inject the game with greater excitement and more historicity, it is still not for the faint of heart. Preliminary play-testing through 1941 suggests that, while this rules option does not make the game unplayable, it does make it highly volatile. Moreover, because the adoption of the “neutral” repair rules set inevitably will place a great deal of pressure on the Red Army during the summers of both 1941 and 42, it is strongly recommended that — if this rules set is used — that the strongest, most-experienced players manage the Soviet defenses. And even then, the Russian commanders will probably need every bit of skill and cunning that they can muster to prevent the game from turning into an Axis “romp”.

2. Kampfgruppen and Battlegroups (changes to Rules Case 10.3):

Russian guard lights two German POWs cigarettes.

The formation of Kampfgruppen or Battlegroups (hereafter referred to as BGs) upon the elimination of German infantry divisions or Soviet rifle corps is no longer automatic. Instead, a die is rolled for each infantry division or rifle corps destroyed in combat and — depending on the affected unit’s circumstances, nationality, and type — may or may not result in a BG being formed. Note that this rules change does not affect armored or mechanized divisions or corps; nor does it pertain to those German infantry divisions reduced to BGs to satisfy the “First Winter” rule; in both of these situations, the affected units always form BGs. In all other cases, the aforementioned rules changes apply. The process for actually determining infantry Kampfgruppe and Battlegroup formation is, as follows:

a) All regular German infantry divisions (6-5s) and Finnish divisions (4-5s) form a BG on a die roll of 1 to 6.
b) All Soviet Guards rifle corps (5-5s) form a BG on a die roll of 1 to 5.
c) All German security divisions (6-3s) and regular Soviet rifle corps (4-4s) form a BG on a die roll of 1 to 4.

In addition to the above changes in the procedure used to determine BG formation, individual BG die rolls may also be subject to certain adverse adjustments. These die roll modifications (DRMs) are cumulative and are applied in the following combat situations:

a) +1 DRM: If the unit is eliminated while defending against an attack (Finnish divisions defending in “Old Finland” are not affected).
b) +1 DRM: If the unit is eliminated (whether attacking or defending) while unsupplied.
c) +1 DRM: If a German (only) unit is eliminated (whether attacking or defending) during game turns 21-40 (the first Russian winter), inclusive.

Rationale:

Russian Siberian soldiers, Battle of Moscow.

Kampfgruppen and Battlegroups represent — at least, in game terms — that cadre of officers, NCOs, and seasoned veterans around which a combat unit can, with the infusion of fresh manpower and new equipment, be restored to full effectiveness. Needless-to-say, the survival of this core manpower component during heavy or prolonged fighting is a function of a variety of factors; the most important of which are: training, leadership, logistical support, experience, and morale. And it is because of the effects of several critical factors that the recommended rules for German and Russian BG formation vary. To explain why this is so, a brief historical detour is probably in order.

Russian troops on the march, December 1941.

At the outset of “Barbarossa,” the German army — having already fought victorious military campaigns in Poland, Denmark, Norway, France and the Low Countries, and the Balkans — was unequalled in terms of operational leadership and doctrine, morale, unit cohesion, and combat effectiveness. The opposing Red Army, in contrast, was in disarray. Stalin’s senseless and brutal purge of the professional officer corps had stripped the Soviet army, not only of almost all of its senior leadership, but also of many of its most experienced intermediate-level commanders. The consequences of this ill-considered policy were soon exposed, in the course of the Russo-Finnish War, both to the Soviet Union’s political leadership, and to interested eyes in Berlin. The war with the Finns lasted barely five months, yet it still managed to present an unflattering image of the Red Army’s battle-worthiness. Russian forces finally managed, by March of 1940, to grind out a victory of sorts against the outnumbered Finns, but, much to the shock of Stalin and his small clique of loyal generals in Moscow, the war’s cost in Soviet battlefield casualties, and destroyed and lost equipment had been horrific. Moreover, the miserable performance of the Red Army in its campaign against the Finns was not lost on Hitler or the Oberkommando des Heeres. To make matters worse, the rapid collapse of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940 convinced the Soviet high command to abandon its original strategy for a “linear defense” of Russia’s western frontier, and to adopt, instead, a “defense in depth.” Unfortunately for the Russians, this hastily-planned redeployment of frontier forces was still underway when Hitler struck on 22 June, 1941.



Russian column on the move in winter, WWII.

Obviously, the German and Finnish advantages in overall unit quality at the onset of the war were pronounced; just as important, however, the historical record suggests that this advantage in organization and unit cohesion persisted right up until the end of the war. The “die roll modifiers” are based on the more general effects of different types of combat operations. For example, it is much more likely that a defending unit that has been overwhelmed by an attacker would be completely destroyed, than it is that an attacking formation would press an assault to the point that its core infrastructure of equipment, combat leaders, and veteran soldiers would be wiped-out. On the other hand, the increased likelihood that either an unsupplied attacking or defending unit would lose its unit cohesion, particularly when engaged in prolonged combat, seems, on its face, to be reasonable. Finally, the effects of the first Russian winter on German combat operations are well enough documented that they really require no elaboration. Suffice to say that the Germans were both unprepared and ill-equipped for the conditions that they encountered during the Russian winter of 1941-42, and that they paid an exorbitant price for their triumphalism and for the short-sighted planning that resulted from it.

Probable Effects of Recommended Changes:

Nazi graves near Leningrad, 1943.

Both sides should see a lot more casualties as a significant number of Russian rifle corps (particularly during the first two summers) and German divisions (during the first winter and then resuming in 1943-45) go straight into the “dead pile” without forming Battlegroups or Kampfgruppen. For the Russians, these additional infantry losses will typically require a heavier than usual investment in both rifle division construction and conversion, at least until the winter of 1943; for the Germans, this means that the Rebuilding Track will fill up very quickly, and will pretty much stay full for the balance of the Campaign Game. For both sides, armies will be weaker, and this, in turn, will mean that frontlines will be thinner and reserve formations will be less plentiful in 1942 than in the standard game. Moreover, because of the across-the-board reduction in unit density brought about by this rules change, the possibility of breakthroughs will be increased; therefore both sides will have to tend very carefully to their defensive arrangements, particularly if they face a determined and well-supported enemy offensive. Lastly, in and of itself, this rules change probably won’t break the WAR IN THE EAST Campaign Game wide open, but it will insure that both sides will, at different stages in the war, face much thornier than usual defensive challenges as the game wears on.

CONCLUSION TO PART I

German cavalry, WWII

More recommended WAR IN THE EAST rules changes are coming soon. This essay is the first of several that will propose a collection of — in my opinion, at least — challenging and historically-grounded changes to the standard rules for the first edition of WAR IN THE EAST. My goal, in presenting these rules alternatives, is to rekindle a little interest in this great old title, and perhaps, to spur a few players to do a little experimenting with the game on their own. That being said, Part II of this series will — when I get around to publishing it — offer yet a few more recommended changes to the standard WIE Campaign Game rules that, hopefully, will complement those presented here. Of course you can’t please everyone, so for those readers who don’t like any of the recommendations that I have put forward thus far, I urge them to do a little rules tinkering on their own. While it is rarely worthwhile to radically alter a simulation’s basic design architecture, sometimes one or two small tweaks can have a very pleasing effect on a game and its playability. And when looking for rules inspiration, the historical record is almost always a great source for new ideas.

Finally, for those players who prefer to leave the ‘rules writing’ to others, I offer a word of warning: some of the rules modifications recommended herein have been tested fairly extensively, but some have not (much like most commercially-produced games). For this reason, those readers who are tempted to actually experiment with one or more of these optional rules are urged to proceed with caution; some changes, as already noted, will have only a modest effect on the game, but others have the potential to affect play and play-balance significantly. Consider this “a word to the wise.”

Recommended Reading

See my blog post Book Reviews of these titles which are strongly recommended for those readers interested in further historical background, or just go ahead and get the books:

Book Review:  Battle of Kursk , Book Review: Panzer Battles, Book Review:  German Army 1933-1945
, Book Review:  Genius for War, the German Army ,Book Review:  Command Decisions


  

THE GREAT WAR IN THE EAST: Four Battles from World War I is a set of four games each simulating a different critical battle on the Eastern Front during World War One. The four battles represented in this collection of games are: CAPORETTO, THE BRUSILOV OFFENSIVE, SERBIA/GALICIA, and VON HINDENBERG IN POLAND. These engagements are little known to many students of military affairs, yet the repercussions from these various battles are almost incalculable: the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman Empires would collapse because of these and other military defeats. New nations would come into being as a result; and new and toxic ideologies like Communism, Fascism, and Nazism would rise to power from the ashes of the old empires. With the end of the First World War, the stage of old Europe would quickly be occupied by a new set of political actors whose ideologies and ambitions would, in the span of one generation, inexorably prepare the European stage for World War Two.

DESCRIPTION

The four games that make up THE GREAT WAR IN THE EAST (along with a fifth title: the S&T Magazine Game, TANNENBERG) utilize a similar mix of game components, and are designed around a set of Standard Rules that are common to them all. Each individual simulation also has its own short set of Exclusive Rules specific to that game. This design format makes it almost effortless to move from one game to the next without a lot of time spent learning a new game system with each new title. Thus, each game while similar to the others in this set, still offers the players a different and unique gaming experience.

Underpinning the standard game system of THE GREAT WAR IN THE EAST is a relatively conventional design platform embellished with a few unconventional “wrinkles” which, considering that all of the "quadri-game's" titles are World War I games, often allow for a surprising amount of fluid, mobile action. Each of these titles is played in game turns which typically represent three days of real time. Individual game turns are divided into an Entente followed by a Central Powers player turn; however in certain scenarios, the Central Powers player will move first, as the Entente side is assumed to have already acted in the initial game turn. Each title in the "quadri-game" includes its own four-color, hexagonal grid game map which depicts the historical battlefields on the Eastern, Balkan, and Italian Fronts where the game's different actions actually occurred. The back-printed unit counters represent the historical combat units (brigades, divisions, and corps) that took part, or that could have participated in the various campaigns.

The basic mechanics of THE GREAT WAR IN THE EAST series, are “Igo-Ugo” with each player moving and then attacking in turn. Movement is typically restricted to two types: regular ground movement and rail movement. The supply rules — although important from the standpoint of movement, combat, and attrition — are neither complicated nor particularly onerous. The real essence of the game system comes from the command and control (headquarters) and Tactical Competence Rating (TCR) rules. To move or attack normally, a unit must not only be in supply, it must also be within range of a friendly headquarters unit. Each headquarters unit — very much like Russian leaders in PANZERGRUPPE GUDERIAN — has both a command “span” (the range in hexes over which orders may be broadcast) and a command “capacity” (the number of unit stacking points that may be controlled in each game turn). Interestingly, while command from a headquarters, depending on the TCR value of a unit, may not be required for movement, it is absolutely required for a unit to attack. The TCR rules are, in some ways, a natural compliment to the headquarters rules. Each combat unit in THE GREAT WAR IN THE EAST has a TCR value of from 1 (the best) to 4 (the worst). These ratings are important because, not only do they affect a unit’s movement initiative, they also affect both its ability to traverse difficult terrain and its ability to retreat into or through enemy zones of control (more on this retreat effect, later). Returning to the issue of movement initiative, units that, for one reason or another, do not receive movement orders from a friendly headquarters, or cavalry units that are being attacked by enemy units may still be activated via a successful die roll. In these situations, if the die roll is greater than a combat unit’s TCR value, then the unit may move normally, or, in the case of “screening” cavalry, may withdraw before combat.

Interestingly, the standard combat rules for THE GREAT WAR IN THE EAST, like the headquarters rules, are very reminiscent of PGG. Combat between adjacent enemy units is always voluntary; however, as noted earlier, a phasing unit MUST receive “orders” from a friendly headquarters to be able to attack. The standard game platform uses a PGG-style split-result, odds-differential combat results table (CRT), with combat results displayed as numerical values. In the case of the defender, losses may be taken either as steps, as retreat hexes, or as some combination of the two. However — this being a game about World War I — the attacker may never retreat, but, instead, must always extract any required combat losses as casualties. Needless-to-say, with this type of combat system, it is very difficult for the attacker to inflict battlefield losses on any defender who can retreat as a result of combat. This all changes, however, if the defender can be surrounded prior to combat, is not adjacent to any friendly-occupied flight hexes, AND the unit being attacked has a TCR value of 2 or more. The defender’s TCR value is important because units with a TCR of 1 (think: Germans) may retreat through enemy ZOCs without penalty, while all other units (think: Entente) are subject to elimination.

Victory in all of the games in THE GREAT WAR IN THE EAST series of games is based on a comparison of the respective victory points levels of the two sides at the conclusion of play. The specific victory conditions will vary from game to game (and scenario to scenario), but typically are determined by the capture and control of certain geographical objectives and, as might be expected, the destruction of enemy combat strength.

THE INDIVIDUAL GAMES

CAPORETTO is an operational simulation of the combined Austro-Hungarian and German offensive in the fall of 1917 that shattered the Italian Army and almost knocked Italy out of the war. This offensive is also of note because it marked the first use, by the Germans, of the new Stosstruppen infiltration tactics that would later be used at Riga and on the Western Front in the closing months of the war. CAPORETTO offers two scenarios: the historical scenario; and the Tyrol Offensive scenario. In addition, for those admirers of Erwin Rommel, the designer offers a “Heroic Leader” rule to reflect the impact of certain effective low-ranking officers during this battle. The historical game is fifteen turns long and was designed by Albert A. Nofi.

THE BRUSILOV OFFENSIVE is simulation of the large-scale Russian offensive against the Austro-Hungarian and German armies in Galicia in June, 1916. The Brusilov Offensive, despite its success, was a contributing factor in the ultimate collapse of the Tsarist government; as the game’s introduction puts it: “In terms of territory captured and losses inflicted, this offensive was the most successful operation conducted against the Central Powers during the entire war. The failure of the Russians to eliminate the Austro-Hungarians from the war dictated their eventual military collapse, deepening the despair that was a factor in fomenting the “October Revolution” of 1917.” THE BRUSILOV OFFENSIVE offers two scenarios: the historical scenario (June 4^th start of the offensive); and the attack on schedule scenario in which the offensive is delayed to its originally planned start date of June 15^th 1916. To give the players more game options, the designer also offers four additional scenario variations: Early Release of the Russian Special Guards Army; West Front Offensive; Increased Supply and Rail Capacity; and Better Commanders. The historical game is fourteen turns long and was designed by James F. Dunnigan.

SERBIA/GALICIA is a simulation of the two-front strategic dilemma facing Austria-Hungary in the opening months of World War I. With the onset of war, Austria-Hungary wass confronted by two immediate military threats: the Serbian Army on its southern flank; and a Russian invasion of its eastern province of Galicia. SERBIA/GALICIA offers three scenarios: the historical campaign scenario; the free deployment campaign scenario; and the 1 September 1914: Decision in Galicia scenario. In addition, the designer offers several optional rules including: The wrong envelope rule; the Austrian attack imperative; and the cavalry forage rule. The historical game is thirteen turns long and was designed by J. A. Nelson.

VON HINDENBERG IN POLAND is a simulation of the German Warsaw-Lodz Campaign of September-November 1914. This operation, planned by Germany’s commanders in East Prussia: von Hindenberg and Ludendorff, had as its objective the seizure of the Vistula crossings followed by the capture of the Russian-controlled city of Warsaw. The German destruction of the Russian 2^nd Army at Tannenberg in August, had temporarily relieved pressure on the Germans from the Russian forces in the East, but had led to an inconclusive series of engagements in late August and early September. The German high command was confident that this campaign would regain the initiative which had shifted to the Russians, and provide for a more aggressive, less static defense of German territory in the East. While the Germans made their preparations, the Russians also planned. In late September, the Grand Duke Nicholas, as Russian Supreme Commander, ordered the redeployment of three Russian armies from Galicia to the Polish salient with the intention of launching a powerful drive into Germany. This is the historical situation the two players find themselves in at the beginning of VON HINDENBERG IN POLAND: two contending forces, both committed to the offensive and unaware of the other’s plans, prepare to crash head-on into each other in Poland. Although, the game only offers the historical scenario, it does include several optional rules that can dramatically affect the course of play: Central Powers hidden movement, and Russian garrison restrictions. The game is fifteen turns long and was designed by Anthony Beavers.

Game Components (for all four Games):

• Four 16” x 22” hexagonal grid Map Sheets (with Turn Record Chart and Terrain Key incorporated)
• 800 ½” cardboard Counters
• Two 8½” x 11” Standard Rules Booklets (with Combat Results Table and Terrain Effects Chart incorporated)
• Four 8½” x 11” Exclusive Rules Booklets (with Scenario Instructions)
• One 8½” x 11” Historical Background Booklet
• One 8½” x 11” Hidden Unit Display (VON HINDENBERG IN POLAND only)
• One small six-sided Die
• One 8” x 11½” SPI Mail Order Catalog
• One 3½” x 8½” Customer Response Card
• One SPI 9¼” x 12” x 2” bookcase-style Game Box

A SUGGESTED “BARBAROSSA” SET-UP FOR THE RUSSIANS IN “WAR IN THE EAST 2nd EDITION”

For many people who play and collect traditional wargames, there almost always comes a point at which — seduced by the twin devils of acquisitiveness and curiosity — they decide that they just have to try their hand at a “really, really, really BIG game.” The unique pleasure of surveying a map surface the size of a small swimming pool decorated with thousands of small, colorful cardboard counters, some of which occasionally and mysteriously catapult themselves into the air without warning, is something that every game player should experience — at least once. But maps and counters are not the only source of delight for a “monster” game’s owner: there are all the other accessories that come with this unique type of game. For instance, there are the numerous charts, and the combat results tables, and the turn record/reinforcement tracks, and, of course, there are the rules: pages and pages of rules. And once everyone has (sort of) read the rules, there are the pages and pages of errata. Then there are the always helpful “player’s notes” which seem, even after multiple readings, to have been either mistakenly included with the wrong game, or to have been badly translated from some unknown and incomprehensible foreign language. Next, assuming that you still decide that you really want to play the thing, then someone has to round up enough warm bodies to actually get a game underway. Nothing, except perhaps organizing a multi-lingual family reunion, even comes close to the fun one can have when it comes to coordinating the schedules of multiple players over a period of months.

I know the feeling well. Over the years, I have owned almost two dozen of these “monsters” and I have actually played most of them. I’m not quite sure what this says about me and my friends, but I have to admit that, in the case of more than a few of these titles, I have even played them multiple times — often, all the way to the “bitter end”. In the course of these many gaming sessions, one particularly frustrating aspect of playing really big, really long games came through time and time again: the shallow learning curve of most players, myself included. There is no feeling that quite matches the panic that — with dozens of hours already invested in a game — suddenly freezes everyone around the game table when they realize either that a) a crucial rule has been ignored or misinterpreted, or b) that everyone (usually on my side) has been oblivious to a simple and obvious tactic that, had it actually been used, would have completely changed the course of the game.

After repeatedly experiencing the major letdown from having one of these huge, multi-player games suddenly and unexpectedly self-destruct, I finally came up with a strategy for tackling these “monsters” that seems, at least for me, to work pretty well.

DNO/UNT Workbook

The first thing I discovered was that, for those of us who do not have photographic memories, it is best to write down anything that seems relevant or interesting the minute it crops up during both the planning and the play of a “monster” game. In fact, for major projects like GDW’s DNO/UNT or SPI’s WAR IN THE EAST, I took to preparing a notebook in advance of the start of each new match. Then, during both the planning and the actual play of the game, I wrote down anything that I thought might be useful as the game progressed. Very soon, I discovered that it was worthwhile to record even simple things; things such as: map peculiarities and irregularities; general thoughts on the defense and offense; the maximum offensive strength of attacks from one, two, and three hexes. I made entries on the use of air power and paratroops; the optimal placement of fortifications; and possible force organizations. I also made notes on the distances between different map locations, and even a record of the numbers and types of units lost. I still have most of these old notebooks, today — you never know.

The second discovery I made was that, if a player understood enough about a game’s rules and its mechanics of play to construct a competent defense, then he probably had a reasonable command of the basic details of the game system. For this reason, I began to volunteer to play the defense, at least during the first attempt at a game, whenever I and my friends embarked on one of these major gaming projects. And when I did play the offense, I made it a point to carefully inspect the opposing side’s defensive arrangements to see if their dispositions revealed anything about the game that I hadn’t tumbled to on my own.

This is the somewhat dubious logic behind my decision to post one of my old Soviet “Barbarossa” opening set-ups (I actually had three) for SPI’s WAR IN THE EAST (2nd Edition). I am not offering this set-up as some sort of “perfect” Russian plan, or even as particularly clever approach to the first turn defense of the Soviet frontier. I present this “Barbarossa” defense only as a play aide for those who may own this title, but who have never actually set it up and played it. I hope that this “pre-packaged” opening will provide those players who are interested, with a shortcut to learning the game system and to how the different factors of terrain, unit strengths, and unit types all come together on the game map. Also, it will quickly become apparent that no hex locations are included in this “Barbarossa” defense either for the Soviet armies in the interior, or for the units on the Finnish border. The interior reserve units will typically be deployed on rail lines so that they can either rail to a Training Center or, in the case of many of the infantry divisions, to positions where they can begin to construct the “winter” fortified line. The Soviet forces on the Finnish border are pretty easy to deploy as they won’t initially be under any significant offensive pressure from the Finns: Finland is neutral on the first game turn of “Barbarossa.”

I should add a final observation about the following Soviet set-up: it is intended to accomplish two primary goals during the first German game turn of the “Barbarossa” scenario. First, this deployment prevents the Wehrmacht from breaking through the Russian front and exploiting into the Red Army’s rear during the German mechanized movement phase on turn one. Second, this set-up also prevents the initial advance of the German Army’s three most important units: the railroad repair units. Because the scope of the Wehrmacht’s advance during the first summer is limited only by its supply range, every game turn that the railroad repair units are delayed, is one hex further west that the Red Army can hold during Germany’s first campaign season. And while the Soviets can only expect to delay the German railroad repair units attached to Army Group North and Army Group Center one game turn. The repair unit advancing out of Romania could well be held up for two and maybe even three game turns. This multi-turn delay means that, if the Germans intend to capture Kharkov during the first summer, then they will probably have to begin their assault against the city’s outer defenses before their supply line can reach the battle area.

WAR IN THE EAST 2nd EDITION
Soviet Deployment for Barbarossa Scenario

Riga Reserve: 1 x 3-5, 5 x 2-5, 8 x 1-4, 2 x (1)-10, 1 x 1-3


Map Hex #
G 1510 1-3
1412 3 x 1-4
1413 1-4, (1)-10
1414 1-4, 2-5
1311 1-4, 2-5
1312 1-4, 2-5
1313 2-5, 3-5, (1)-10
1314 1-4, 2-5
________________________________________________________________________

Lithuania: 2 x 3-5, 5 x 2-5, 16 x 1-4, 3 x (1)-10


Map Hex #
G 1415 1-4, (1)-10
1416 1-4, (1)-10
1315 1-4, 2-5
1316 1-4, 2-5
1317 2 x 3-5, (1)-10
1318 3 x 1-4
1319 2 x 1-4
1212 1-4, 2-5
1214 1-4
1217 3 x 1-4
1218 1-4, 2-5
1112 1-4, 2-5

________________________________________________________________________

Poland: 5 x 3-5, 13 x 2-5, 52 x 1-4, 5 x (1)-10, 3 x 1-3, 3 x 10-1-10


Map Hex #
G 1219 3 x 1-4
1119 1-4, 2-5
1120 2 x 3-5, (1)-10
1121 3 x 1-4
1123 2 x 1-4, 10-1-10
1124 1-4, 2 x 10-1-10
1020 1-4, 2-5
1021 2 x 3-5, (1)-10
1022 3 x 1-4
0922 1-4, 2-5

Map Hex #
G 0923 1-4, 2-5
0924 2 x 1-4
0925 2 x 1-4
0926 1-4, 2-5, (1)-10
0927 3 x 1-4
0928 3 x 1-4
0820 1-4
0826 2 x 1-4
0827 2 x 1-4
0828 1-4, 2-5, (1)-10
0829 2 x 1-4
0729 1-4, 2-5
0730 3 x 1-4
0629 1-3, 2-5
0630 1-4, 2-5
0530 1-4, 2-5
0531 1-4, (1)-10
0430 1-3, 2-5
0431 3-5
0331 1-4, 2-5
0332 1-4, 2-5
0231 2 x 1-4, 1-3

Map Hex #
H 0904 1-4
0703 1-4
0602 1-4
0503 2 x 1-4
0401 1-4

________________________________________________________________________

Bessarabia: 2 x 3-5, 4 x 2-5, 20 x 1-4, 1-3


Map Hex #
H 1209 1-4
1210 1-4
1211 1-4
1214 2-5


Map Hex #
H 1215 1-3
1106 1-4
1107 1-4
1108 1-4
1109 2-5, 3-5
1110 1-4
1111 1-4
1115 2 x 1-4
1004 1-4
1005 2-5, 3-5
1006 1-4
1007 1-4
1008 1-4
0905 1-4
0914 1-4
0803 2-5
0804 1-4
0704 1-4
0603 2 x 1-4
_______________________________________________________________________

Odessa Reserve: 3-5, 2-5, 8 x 1-4, 2 x 1-3


Map Hex #
H 1712 3-5
1612 2-5
1509 2 x 1-4
1409 3 x 1-4
1212 1-4
1213 1-4
1112 1-3
1113 1-3
1114 1-4